1. Zum Recht im allgemeinen.--Bd. 2. Rechtsquellen.--Bd. 3. Rechtssammlungen.--Bd. 4. Sammlungen der Rechtspraxis.--Bd. 5. Rechtszweige.--Bd. 6. Struktur der Staatsgewalten.--Bd. 7. Rechtssetzung. 2 v.--Bd. 8. Rechtsanwendung.--Bd. 9. Rechtsvollstreckung.

The 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' is an encyclopaedia of philosophical topics promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate and published, in its third and last edition in 2006, by the Bompiani publishing house in Milan. The first edition of the 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' was promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate in the 1950s, seeing the light in 1957-58. A second edition, published by the Sansoni publishing house in Florence, was published in 1968-69 and reprinted in 1979. The third (...) and last edition, published by Bompiani in 2006, is intended to cover the whole of philosophical knowledge and related disciplines with over ten thousand entries edited by about a thousand academics, both Italian and non-Italian, and distributed in twelve volumes for a total of 12,496 pages. (shrink)

De entre todos los fascículos de la revista Valori Plastici llama la atención su número II-III. Mientras que la revista siempre se caracterizó por poner el foco en Italia, estenúmero se centra en el arte cubista francés. Se propone aquí como objetivo defender,mediante una metodología documental que aporta los documentos inéditosconsultados en el Archivio del 900’(MART), que fue precisamente Severini el encargado de realizar ese fascículo y que con ello instauró un corto período de relaciones entrelos artistas vinculados a los (...) Valori Plastici y él mismo, con interesantes consecuencias para la comunicación entre los ámbitos artísticos italiano y francés. (shrink)

Politics is hugely complex. Some try to reduce its complexity by examining it through an ideological worldview, a one-size-fits-all prescriptive formula or a quantitative examination of as many 'facts' as possible. Yet politics cannot be adequately handled as if it were made of cells and particles: ideological views are oversimplifying and sometimes dangerous. Politics is not simply a moral matter, nor political philosophy a subdivision of moral philosophy. This book is devised as a basic conceptual lexicon for all those who (...) want to understand what politics is, how it works and how it changes or fails to change. Key concepts such as power, conflict, legitimacy and order are clearly defined and their interplay in the state, interstate and global level explored. Principles such as liberty, equality, justice and solidarity are discussed in the context of the political choices confronting us. This compact and systematic introduction to the categories needed to grasp the fundamentals of politics will appeal to readers who want to gain a firmer grasp on the workings of politics, as well as to scholars and students of philosophy, political science and history. (shrink)

This paper breaks with the sociological notion of ‘risk society’ and argues in favour of a philosophical view that sees the two planetary threats of late modernity, nuclear weapons and global warming, as ultimate challenges to morality and politics rather than risks that we can take and manage. The paper also raises the question of why we should feel responsible for the effects of these two global challenges on future generations and in this sense elaborates on the transgenerational chain of (...) parenthood rather than on considerations of justice. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

The peaceful and democratic integration of the European countries cannot be completed if the EU does not become a true, though not-federal, polity. Making the European institutions fully legitimate and accountable requires the development of political identity in a shape which is different from both national and cultural identity and is not merely opposite to diversity and change. Its contents can be seen in a specific set of constitutional values and principles, including a model of social relations, an international standing (...) and a peculiar and unprecedented system of governance. Identity-formation in the EU goes through several channels, but has still to generate a European public sphere, though the source of this difficulty does not lie in the lack of a European people or demos. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

Le travail de Kurt Walter Zeidler n’est pas connu en France, mais il représente aujourd’hui la tentative la plus ambitieuse et la plus aboutie pour interpréter la philosophie critique à partir de son double héritage, postkantien et néokantien. Comme l’indiquent ici un grand nombre de ses collègues et de ses disciples, son œuvre très fournie part du constat que l’idéalisme transcendantal n’est pas vraiment parvenu à fonder la synthèse de la raison et de la réalité et à résorber le divorce (...) que le nominalisme a introduit entre le logos et le monde quand il a érigé le sujet en instance jugeante détachée de tout (p. 18, 574). Kant a fait le premier pas pour émanciper la logique du primat de la forme judicative (p. 67). Mais ni son contextualisme temporel, qui rapporte tout ce qui est su à la forme du temps (p. 345), ni les efforts de son continuateur Cohen pour fonder l’idéalisme critique sur un dépassement du psychologisme n’ont réussi à réconcilier la raison avec la réalité ou à rétablir son unité (p. 205). (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

In this paper we ask whether approximation for abstract argumentation is useful in practice, and in particular whether reasoning with grounded semantics – which has polynomial runtime – is already an approximation approach sufficient for several practical purposes. While it is clear from theoretical results that reasoning with grounded semantics is different from, for example, skeptical reasoning with preferred semantics, we investigate how significant this difference is in actual argumentation frameworks. As it turns out, in many graphs models, reasoning with (...) grounded semantics actually approximates reasoning with other semantics almost perfectly. An algorithm for grounded reasoning is thus a conceptually simple approximation algorithm that not only does not need a learning phase – like recent approaches – but also approximates well – in practice – several decision problems associated to other semantics. (shrink)

L’essentiel des œuvres de Patočka et du dernier Foucault peut se lire à la lumière de la figure de Faust. Celle-ci éclaire en effet, au fil de ses variantes, ce qui oppose savoir de spiritualité et savoir de connaissance. Si l’on entend par spiritualité l’effort pour penser ensemble l’acte de connaissance et une transformation dans l’être du sujet, la légende faustienne illustre autant qu’elle questionne la pratique qui établit l’individu comme un être à même de se soucier de soi. Nous (...) préciserons cette idée à partir d’un exemple, celui de l’idéalisme allemand, en nous demandant s’il a su prendre la mesure de cette dimension faustienne de la philosophie et chercherons à savoir si c’est effectivement « le souci du souci de soi » qui l’a mis en mouvement ou l’a conduit à rechercher les conditions d’une spiritualité moderne. Nous nous demanderons, pour le dire dans des termes plus proches de ceux de Patočka, si l’on peut déjà apercevoir dans le postkantisme quelque chose qui anticipe l’idée d’une vue intellectuelle rendue possible par le phénomène. (shrink)

Chasing Reality deals with the controversies over the reality of the external world. Distinguished philosopher Mario Bunge offers an extended defence of realism, a critique of various forms of contemporary anti-realism, and a sketch of his own version of realism, namely hylorealism. Bunge examines the main varieties of antirealism - Berkeley's, Hume's, and Kant's; positivism, phenomenology, and constructivism - and argues that all of these in fact hinder scientific research. Bunge's realist contention is that genuine explanations in the sciences (...) appeal to causal laws and mechanisms that are not directly observable, rather than simply to empirical generalisations. Genuine science, in his view, is objective even when it deals with subjective phenomena such as feelings of fear. This work defends a realist view of universals, kinds, possibilities, and dispositions, while rejecting contemporary accounts of these that are couched in terms of modal logic and 'possible worlds.'. (shrink)

In this article the claim of normative ethics to be the main philosophical access to the problems raised by climate change is contested and instead it is suggested that these problems be addressed from a different perspective: that of a political philosophy that escapes its own reduction to a theory of justice. Part I shows several incidences of how mainstream climate ethics fails with regard to its intention to shape an effective climate policy. Part II argues that ‘politics for the (...) future’ as required by man-made lethal challenges has to complement the adversarial politics-as-usual. Included here is a redefinition of what the relationship of politics and morality means in the new circumstances – not only with regard to climate change. (shrink)

Cette section décrit comment le vouloir se porte sur un objet extérieur, c’est-à-dire s’intuitionne dans son produit tout en s’en distinguant. Comment s’effectue le passage du subjectif dans l’objectif si, conformément au principe du système, agir et intuitionner ne font qu’un ? Est-ce une limite de l’idéalisme que de ne concevoir l’action que comme une intuition ou ce point de vue nous offre-t-il de nouvelles ressources pour penser ensemble la liberté de la volonté et sa nécessaire phénoménalisation ? La réflexion (...) sur le droit et l’histoire montre que l’idéalisme transcendantal ne peut garantir l’efficacité de notre activité pratique qu’en faisant de la nature l’élément inconscient qui permet aux libertés de s’objectiver, c’est-à-dire de s’éduquer mutuellement.This section describes how the will goes to an external object, or intuits itself in its product while distinguishing itself from it. How is made the passage of the subjective in the objective if, according to the principle of the system, acting and having an intuition make one ? Is it a limit of the schellingian idealism to conceive action as an intuition or does this point of view offer us new resources to think together freedom of the will and its necessary phenomenalisation ? The reflection on right and history shows that the transcendental idealism can warrant the efficiency of our practical activity only by making nature the unconscious element which allows freedoms to objectify themselves, that is to educate themselves mutually. (shrink)

The paper explores the semiotic and legal semiotic perspectives related to posthumous digital face. In doing so, the contribution also seeks to explore the complex relationship between AI-generated faces, including deep fakes, mourning, and posthumous rights. The article has five parts. In the introduction, we discuss the challenges of _posthumous existence_ and the issues related to respecting the deceased. We also examine some examples of ‘digital personhood’. In part two, we present three case studies and use semiotics to help us (...) distinguish between _posthumous existence_ and _digital resurrection_. In part three, we provide a semiotic classification of representation in the context of digital faces and our case studies. We suggest that there is a difference between the _phenomenological presence_ of a hologram and the _cognitive value_ of recreating someone’s identity, including their biography, face, and voice. In part four, we explore the topic of digital spectra and mourning, including the concept of _imputability_. In part five, we analyse how the law offers new insights into the ontology of the face of the deceased and posthumous existence in hologram form. In the conclusion, we summarise the article’s key findings and highlight open issues and potential future developments. (shrink)

En este texto se hace una brevísima reflexión en torno al quehacer filosófico como labor temporal ceñida al presente, el filosofar en su estructura fundamental ha de ser cuestionado desde lo local en razón a su temporalidad actual. Lo presentado es más que una apuesta, un alto en el camino para examinar las fuentes de la eventualidad y sus estructuras fundamentales.

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)